Abstract

Resource management problems are often the result of serious changes in ecosystems, which are caused by humans' overuse, for example deforestation of the tropical rain forest. The main reason for overuse lies on the one hand in a specific interaction between ecological conditions and human thought and behavior and, on the other hand, in social conflicts, which arise when several parties simultaneously use resources. In the first case, those involved exploit natural, self-regenerating resources whose laws of regeneration are either not known or hard to recognize. The individual gains immediate profit through use of the resource, while loss, caused by damage to the resource, shows up only later in time. This is difficult for humans to assess and thus can cause inappropriate resource-use behavior. In the second case, social conflict arises because profit through overuse is gained by the individual, whereas damage to the resource must be born by all.

Further it will be argued, that every environmental and every natural conservation problem has both a social science and a natural science aspect. Effective solutions to these problems thus require cooperation between these sciences. In the following, a suggestion is sketched out which, particularly in the environmental area, can serve as the starting point for cooperation between the social and natural sciences. The perspective provided by research on the Commons Dilemma has a great deal to offer, as it throws the interfaces individual - resource - social system into bold relief.

Keywords: resource management problems - environmental resource - commons dilemma - social system - human dimension - interdisciplinary collaboration

A science of conservation psychology must be able to tell us about the psychological and social factors that play a role when people use a resource. For adequate use of natural resources is a major problem of our times. Think of the over-utilization of wild animal stocks, the over-use of the tropical rainforest, the over-utilization of fertile soil, but also over-utilization of protected conservation areas through excessive numbers of visitors (such as the Galapagos). In all of these cases, individual and social factors play a crucial role. Conservation psychology can and should contribute to the analysis of these factors. What is more, a conservation psychology should provide for possible interfaces to the natural sciences, because solutions to problems with natural resources must, of course, take natural scientific knowledge into account.

In this paper, I will first outline the problem area and then go into a field of research in social psychology that can contribute towards solutions of the problems. Finally, I will examine possible interfaces between a psychology of conservation and work in the natural sciences.

When destruction of the environment is caused by the very many, it becomes difficult for the individual to see his own contribution to the destruction, for example air pollution over city agglomerations, water pollution caused by excess fertilization and so forth. The individual person regrets the damage caused to the environment, but does not grasp that he himself is involved, and therefore the individual undertakes no action to protect the environment. From a social science perspective, this phenomenon can be understood as the consequence of specific interactions at the interface between individual, environmental resource and social system (see fig 1). This mutual interaction, so disastrous to the environment, which takes place on the one hand between human thought, feeling and action and on the other, specific characteristics of resources and laws of the social system, will now be outlined.

Figure 1: The interactions between individual - environmental resource - social system

Underlying behavior towards the environment is almost always the use of natural, self-regenerating resources. Wild animals stocks (whales, herring) and plants (tropical rain forest, grasslands) and also air, water and soil are such resources which are used in some form by humans. However, it is often the case that the laws of regeneration of these resources are unknown or, due to their complexity, very difficult to grasp. In addition, depletion of these resources through over-use usually only shows up non-linearly and with a temporal delay. Humans tend to think in linear terms, but the development of resources within ecological systems cannot be understood in this manner. Further, the individual is so tempted to gain immediate profit from the over-use of the resource that consideration of the loss resulting from damage to the resource which will occur later is neglected.

When several persons use an environmental resource, a social conflict arises, because over-use results in profit to individual persons, while, on the other hand, the resulting damage to the environment will effect all those involved and others as well. Use is individualiced, damage is socialiced. In most cases, individual gain from short-term over-use even exceeds the longer-term damage which will fall back upon the individual, so that over-use seems rewarding. In addition, there is usually uncertainty about how others are behaving, and therefore there is the fear that you will be cheated, if you yourself behave in an environmentally-responsible way. This has the serious result that persons behave in non-ecological ways even when they know better.

In most cases there is an optimal resource management strategy which results in a certain amount of use for the individual and the guarantee that the resource will continuously regenerate. If all persons were to restrict themselves to this amount of use, then each person would, through the course of time, gain the greatest profit from the resource. Each individual person, however, would have an additional advantage, were he to make greater use of the resource. However, if many persons over-use, the resource becomes depleted sooner or later. The environmental problem only comes into being when there is multiple over-use, whereby the damaging contribution of individual persons is minimal with regard to the resource as a whole. Thus it is hardly apparent to the individual how it can happen that from his small over-use, disastrous effects can arise.

Furthermore, in large, anonymous social systems, we must assume that members of the society mutually "block" and "trap" each other in their environmentally-damaging behavior. Through this behavior, all hinder the others from behaving in alternative, environmentally-responsible ways (see Mosler, 1993). The way a resource is used by a social system has a very significant influence upon the behavior of individuals, because it determines the potential total yield for individual use of the resource: If many overuse a still rewarding environmental resource, then the individual person must also overuse (use of an exploited resource is not worth it for anyone). If the individual does not overuse, then she or he suffers not only the long-term depletion caused by overuse, but also profits less than the others in the present. If the collective overuses, then individual over-exploitation of a resource appears "rational". In this way, the collective behavioral pattern is upheld right up to final exhaustion of the resource; to the individual, a personal contribution to conserving the resource by means of restrained use seems, in view of the massive damage to the environment caused by others, insignificant and not "rational".

In the social sciences, the problems outlined here are treated as resource management problems, ecological-social dilemmas or "Commons Dilemma" (Hardin, 1968; Gifford, 1987; Liebrand, Messick, & Wilke, 1992; Brewer & Schneider, 1999). This branch of research is named in the following under the general term Commons Dilemma. The main findings of this area of research are presented in the following.

Commons dilemmas are mainly investigated within social science research by means of experimental games (see Liebrand, et al., 1992; Brewer & Schneider, 1999). In controlled situations, the conditions are varied under which persons make use of a resource together, as for example a self-regenerating pool of numerical points, a simulated stock of fish in a lake, and so on. Subjects are paid out a sum in accordance with the units they use; there is thus the incentive to use the resource. Subjects are randomly divided into an experimental and a control group, but only in the experimental group is a variable manipulated, so that any changes in resource-using behavior of the group can be clearly attributed to this experimental manipulation. In addition, the way in which subjects experience the experimental condition is monitored, and differences at the outset in personal variables are measured. Along with results from laboratory experiments, there are available also findings from successful field experiments (Thompson & Stoutemyer, 1991; Samuelson, 1990). We will not discuss here the factors of internal and external validity of such experiments. However, the findings we describe have all been replicated and confirmed and discussed in research reviews (see Dawes, 1980; Messick & Brewer, 1983; Liebrand, et al., 1992; Sally, 1995). The following main factors of influence, with accompanying findings relevant to resource-use behavior, can be extracted from this body of research:

3.1 Personal motives, that is, whether persons in social situations take only their own personal gain into consideration (individualistic, "nonsocial" orientation) or whether they also take into consideration what others will gain in their decisions (cooperative, "social" orientation), is an important factor of a person's resource-use behavior (Kramer, McClintock, & Messick, 1986; McClintock & Liebrand, 1988). We find that cooperative persons use resources more appropriately than individualistic persons. This becomes especially apparent when a resource is dwindling. In addition, cooperative persons assume that others are also cooperative - individualistic persons expect the contrary.

3.2 Assessment of the state of the resource, that is, how persons evaluate the state of a resource, is a further factor (Jorgenson & Papciak, 1981; Messick, Wilke, Brewer, & Kramer, 1983). If people know that a resource is in a depleted state, they in general reduce their use. If however there is uncertainty (experimentally produced) about the reduction of a resource, increased use of the resource results. Persons also exploit a resource to a greater degree when they know that others are responsible for the depletion than when they can trace depletion of the resource to other causes.

3.3. Payoff structure is another important factor in resource-use behavior (Liebrand, Wilke, & Wolters, 1986; Komorita, Sweeney, & Kravitz, 1980). What is meant here is the possible individual payoff from a resource-use which is dependent upon the number of persons using the resource either responsibly or inappropriately. The following was found: The greater the incentive to use a resource inappropriately, the more persons will overuse. Factors which play a role here are costs (investments) of the use of the resource, profit from use and the rate of regeneration of the resource. Persons tend to behave more inappropriately in regard to the resource when they believe that many others would have to behave in a responsible way in order for all to profit. Under these conditions, they feel that environmentally-responsible behavior in others will hardly be probable.

3.4. Knowledge about others' use of the resource is a central factor in resource-use behavior (Kramer & Brewer, 1984; Liebrand, et al., 1986). If we know that the majority of others involved are making inappropriate use of a resource, then our own use also increases. If individualistic persons know that others are overusing, their own overuse increases to an even greater degree. Cooperative persons do not allow themselves to be influenced by this knowledge.

What conclusions can be derived from the Commons Dilemma research, which has relevance to actual everyday behavior, with regard to possible solutions? And what solutions can be determined empirically?

4.1 In terms of personal motives, persons having a cooperative motive should be supported, as a nuclear group of all environmental strivings. However, these persons should make their cooperative orientation and their resulting environmentally-responsible behavior much more public, so that individualistic persons must correct their opinion that most other persons overuse the environment.

4.2. Correct assessment of the state of a resource is in fact difficult, as many environmental factors cannot be perceived directly. A central method here is to allow, through the use of various means, the state of the resource to be experienced directly. For example, we can bring the state of the resource home to persons through the use of measuring instruments, direct experiences, photomontage or other visual means such as films of worst-case scenarios. Suggestions, such as using analogue visual aids and translating the state of the resource into understandable comparative dimensions, seem promising. However, uncertainties regarding the state of a resource can ultimately hardly be avoided due to the difficulty in perceiving them. Here we should raise the question as to why, with regard to the environment, any environmentally-responsible action must be dependent upon absolute certainty of knowledge, whereas in virtually all other areas of life, no one waits to act until there is absolute clarity in all aspects of the situation.

Findings that show that persons use a resource increasingly when they know that others have caused depletion of the resource support an important conclusion. It must be shown that in addition other, non-human, factors are also responsible for the state of a resource (example: the complex causes of the dying of the forests, the "Waldsterben"), so that depletion of the resource will not become more accelerated by increased use.

4.3 The payoff structure can be directly influenced through the cost/benefit relation of use, for example via taxes and financial incentives. It must pay to behave in an environmentally-responsible way. Using these same means, it would be possible to ensure that even if only a small number of persons are willing to be involved, they will be rewarded for environmentally-responsible actions. Such persons must not experience themselves as doubly disadvantaged in that they both make sacrifices and also must suffer from the damage to a resource caused by others.

4.4 Knowledge of how others are using the resource seems to be the central factor in social dilemmas and is thus the factor which has been most often investigated, with resulting findings, in regard to possible solutions:

a) It has been shown that the simple fact of knowledge of the social conflict in the use of a common resource leads significantly to a more appropriate use of the resource.

b) Communication, speaking together about the conflict, defuses the conflict, especially in those cases where there has been no information on the state of a resource and on others' behavior.

c) Committing agreement as to how a resource will be used in the future leads to appropriate, collective management of a resource.

d) Collective identity which brings forth a feeling of "we-ness" also results in sustainable management.

e) If the above possibilities do not exist, because the users are part of a very large, anonymous group, then appropriate use of a resource must start out from a small group which commits itself to environmentally-responsible behavior and makes this public and subject to open inspection. With this supervised, open commitment, persons reduce their use of the resource, as our own research has demonstrated (Mosler, 1993). Particularly those persons having low environmental consciousness respond to this kind of commitment.

In order for application of these solutions to be effective, they must in addition be firmly founded in natural scientific knowledge of the resource. This will now be explained in the following chapter.

Every environmental and every natural conservation problem has both a social science and a natural science aspect. Effective solutions to these problems thus require cooperation between these sciences. In the following, we sketch out a suggestion which, particularly in the environmental area, can serve as the starting point for cooperation between the social and natural sciences. The perspective provided by research on the Commons Dilemma has in my opinion a great deal to offer, as it throws the interfaces individual - resource - social system into bold relief.

From the natural sciences we require knowledge on the resource, its present state and the characteristics of its regeneration, such as for example the turn-over of the atmosphere above an urban agglomeration, the logistic growth of an animal population, and we require knowledge about the specific conditions which promote or inhibit this, like the geophysical conditions of a lake basin, the essential habitats of an animal population (courtship, nesting and rearing grounds), etc. This knowledge is then applied at the interfaces:

At the interface individual - resource, such knowledge is a prerequisite for correct assessment of the state of a resource by individuals and for an understanding of the specific determinants in non-human factors in the state of the resource.

At the interface social system - resource, natural science knowledge serves as:

a) a basis, for cooperative persons, for resource-appropriate use

b) a basis of the recognition that the resource is common property and thus for awareness of the social conflict in use of the common property

c) a basis for collective optimal use of a resource, which will provide the foundation for determining the proper extent of resource-appropriate use by the individual.

At the interface individual - social system, it is important to stimulate conflict-relevant communication with and among those involved with the aim to achieve binding contracts on appropriate rules of use. In order to prevent those involved from going their merry way in together depleting a resource, unambiguous scientific statements are required which explain how a resource can be a renewable source: How much may each individual use in a way that allows the resource to regenerate? How many gallons of gasoline may each urban resident use per week without contributing to the overstepping of environmental norms? How much fertilizer may a farmer spread on his fields, at what season, in order not to contribute to pollution of lakes and rivers?

The binding agreements we strive for can be more easily reached if, through the aid of social scientific instruments such as opinion research, we achieve social transparency. Those involved learn something about the feelings and opinions of others, their consternation, motivation, their perception of the cost/benefits analysis of behavior towards the environment and their willingness to act. How do others see the situation? And, most importantly: what changes do they suggest and support in their own behavior? We do have at our disposal successful examples of application here (see Heberlein, 1989), and it should not be too difficult to apply these examples to other settings.

In conclusion, I think that I have shown that commons dilemma research can contribute substantial knowledge to the solution of resource management problems. For this reason, this field of psychological knowledge should be integrated as an important branch within conservation psychology. I have also pointed out that for this research area there are important interfaces to natural scientific knowledge that must not only be taken into account but also developed further. It is my hope that this could be another step towards the interdisciplinary efforts that we urgently require.