From the reader:
2) Why doesn't it matter to de Leeuw that hunters don't or can't always follow the rules? Can you relate this to the "naturalistic fallacy" discussed in class?
3) What if hunters NEVER followed the guidelines for ethical hunting -- what then?
4) How did this piece impact your existing judgments about the activities discussed?
5) What about commercial fishing -- how would this apply? How about shark fishing? How about spear fishing?
6) Do you think meat-eating is justified, or not, in the context of modern mass-produced food? Why?
7) What is Chipeniuk's objection to de Leeuw's argument? Is germane? Does he establish it well? How?
8) Both de Leeuw's and Chipeniuk's arguments rely on inferences from evidence about the subjective quality of fishes' experience. Are such inferences avoidable? What kind of arguments could be constructed without use of inferences about fishes' experience? Would their omission make the arguments better, or worse? Why? Which asssertions are most plausible, and why?
9) What point does List raise that de Leeuw has ignored? Did he really ignore it, or is something else going on here?
10) In de Leeuw's reply to Chipeniuk and List, do you think he adequately addresses their objections? Why or why not?
11) With whom do you agree on the matter of conservation here? How do we compare benefits to "nature" versus harms to fish?
2) Why is does it matter whether our scientific concept of 'species' makes sense? What are the implications for ethics of the different possible significances of this term which Rolston examines? How does he settle the matter? Is his answer scientifically valid? Is it valid in terms of common sense? How does it compare to the use of the term in the Endangered Species Act?
3) What difficulties are faced when trying to assimilate species to contractual and utilitarian ethical theories? What kind of wrong does Rolston say it is to extinguish a species? Is it always a wrong, in his view? Do you agree? Does his view constitute a strong case?
4) What role does burden of proof play in his argument?
How does Rolston overcome the difficulties and objections that inevitably arise when minds trained to think of ethics in individualistic terms faces the question of duties to species?
5) What varied factual claims help make Rolston's case? Pick some and examine how he uses them. (For example, "Every extinction is an incremental decay in stopping life processes (723)"; or his discussion of 'genetic load' (723); or the cases of killing goats and rabbits to save endangered plants (722); or the idea that 'in a historical ecosystem, what a thing is differentiates poorly from the generating and sustaining matrix' (p. 725).)
6) What are the implications of Rolston's view for various efforts to save species?
7) Some people claim that human-induced extinction is just another (natural and thus morally neutral) selective force, no different than others in nature, and thus that other organisms must adapt. What would reply could be made based on this article?
8) How would Rolston's view respond to the idea that some species - those that have very small populations, may be over-specialized, and have few or no other species that depend greatly on them - are evolutionarily and ecologically insignificant, and thus might be justifiably sacrificed?
2) Booth argues that the "preservation of morally considerable natural entities requires a society willing not only to limit its material requirement, but also to provide meaningful employment opportunities for all." What is he saying here? Do you agree with him?
3) Taylor has established an environmental ethics system based on the
basic attitude of respect
for nature, and the basic outlook of biocentrism. See if you can apply it
to cases you know about. Here is Taylor's full set of principles
designed to guide conduct to express these (Booth doesn't give them all;
these are from Taylor's book Respect for Nature):
a) Rule of Nonmaleficence: The duty not to do harm to environmental entity that has own good. (see Booth text for more)
b) Rule of Noninterference: This entails two negative duties:
i-refrain from restricting freedom of
individual organisms
ii-employ a 'hands off' policy regarding
whole systems
c) Rule of Fidelity: "This rule applies only to human conduct in relation to individual animals that are in a wild state and are capable of being deceived or betrayed by moral agents.... Under this rule fall the duties not to break a trust that a wild animals places in us (as shown by its behavior), not to deceive or mislead any animal capable of being mislead, to uphold an animal's expectations, which it has formed on the basis of one's past actions with it, and to be true to one's intentions as made known to an animal when it has come to rely on one."
d) Rule of Restitutive Justice: "In its most general terms this rule imposes the duty to restore the balance of justice between a moral agent and a moral subject when the subject has been wronged by the agent." To hold oneself accountable following the breaking of a valid moral rule requires the acknowledgement of a special duty to make amends to the moral subject by some form of compensation or reparation.
"We must.. try to find priority principles for resolving conflicts between humans and nonhumans which do not assign greater inherent worth to humans, but consider all parties as having the same worth. The principles, in other words, must be consistent wth the fundamental requirement of species impartiality.Booth explains 4 of them; the 5th is an application of d) above. When harm is done to animals and plants that are harmless, so some form of reparation or compensation is call for if you actions are to be fully consistent with our attitude of respect for nature.
2) In what ways does ecological restoration implicate humanity?
3) What kind of concept is 'ecological fidelity' in effective restoration? Is it entirely objective? Is it ethical? What are Higgs' objections to how it is presently applied?
4) What kinds of questions reveal why restoration is not only a technical problem? How does Higgs propose to answer them?
2) Some readers respond to Gould's message as if the main point is that what we do doesn't matter. Re-examine what he does say (above question). Why do you suppose some find it easy to overlook this?
3) How does Gould's view of the Mt. Graham red squirrel compare with the framework provided by Rolston?
2) What does she mean a 'revisionist history' of nuclear power?
3) List the various ethical problems, principles and dilemmas she discusses. To what other situations might these apply?
4) What do you think about compensation for the kinds of risks involved in nuclear power? Explain Shrader-Frechette's position on this issue.